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INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to explore three areas - all of which are pertinent to a. (0 
year review of collective bargaining under the Labour Relations ACl 
r"LRA"j.' These areas are: 
• The right to bargain collectively: 
• The constitutional attack on the extension of collective agreements; 
• The current state of sector level bargaining. 
2 THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IN THE LRA 
The right to bargain collectively is shorthand for a range of rights and free-
doms associated with the institution of collective bargaining. Each of these 
rights and freedoms need to be distinguished: 
• There is the freedom to bargain collectively - this is a negative right. It 
is a right normally raised against a government passing legislation pro-
hibiting collective bargaining or having the effect of doing so." 
• There;s the right to use collective economic power in pursuit of a 
demand;3 
• There is the positive right with the concomitant duty to bargain - a. 
stare enforced duty to bargain. The compulsion normally takes the 
form of a judicially enforced duty to bargain. This is the model used in 
the US, Canada and Japan. It was also adopted by the Industrial Court 
under its broad unfair labour practice jurisdiction under the old LRA.; 
The LRA gives effect to all three elements of the right to bargain. ]( gives 
effect to the freedom to bargain collectively by providing the institutional 
infrastructure for voluntary collective bargaining at sector level and for the 
binding nature of collective agreements. It gives effect to the right to usc 
collective economic power in the provisions relating to strikes, lockouts, 
I 66 of J 995 which came into operation on J 1 November! 996. 
2 See Reference re PubUe Service Employee Relations Ad ([ 987) 18 OJ.R (4Ih) 161 
3 See fn·re Certification qf the Constitution oj the Hqwblic of SA. 1996 [946 (I U) BCLR 1253 
& ([ 996) 17 fL..I [253 (ee). ·ColleClivc bargaining ilTlplil:s a right on the part of those 
who crlgage ill collective lJdrgairlillg to exercise economic power against their advers-
aries .. Once a right to collective bargaining is recogniscd. implicil wittiin it will be the 
right co exercise some economic power agairisl partllers ill collective: bargaining' lat 
para 61]. 
4 28 of 1956 
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replacement labour and picketing. And it imposes a positive right and 
structure to bargain collectively in the public sector. But it does not do so 
in respect of the private sector. 
Although trade unions and employers and their associations in the pri~ 
vate sector are free (Q determine the levels and structure of collective bar-
gaining, the LRA clearly promotes sector level bargaining as the preferred 
level. It does so for the following reasons: 
• Sector level bargaining is low on transactional costs. The negotiations 
are conducted by representative organisations; 
• Sector level bargaining shifts collective bargaining on the major issues 
out of the workplace, with that workplace relations are less strained; 
• Bargaining outcomes are general in nature allowing for variation at the 
level of the workplace; 
• Sector level bargaining sets a social floor for competition. By setting 
reasonable standards applicable to all employers in the local market, 
competition between those employers is based on productivity rather 
than socially undesirable wages or extension of hours; 
• Strikes and lockouts take place less frequently at sector level and are 
generally less damaging to individual employers because competitors 
in the local market are also subject to the strike; 
• Labour mobility and economies of scale make sector wide benefit 
schemes desirable. 
The concern that voluntarism may allow employers ro refuse to bargain at 
all is met to some extent by the organisational rights accorded to trade 
unions in Chapter III of the LRA~ and the proVision of a statutory dispute 
resolution procedure. The LRA's approach is to provide (he organisational 
infrastructure for union organisation at the workplace and to provide a 
conciliation procedure to resolve interest disputes irrespective of whether 
the trade union is recognised. 
3 THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Section 23(5) of the Constitution confers the right 'to engage in collective 
bargaining". That phrase has been the subject of contending interpret-
ations in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court - two cases' 
in favour of interpreting it as imposing a duty to bargain and one case 
against.
8 
5 See Pari A ss I I 22. both inclusive 
6 'Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in 
colleclive bargaining. Nalional legislation may be enactet1 ro regulate collective bargain-
ing. To Ihe extent Ihal legislation may limi( 1I right in (his Chapler [he limilalion must 
comply with seclion 36t1)'. 
7 SANDU v Minister of Defence & others (J) 2003 (9) BCLH J 055 [2003J 9 BLI.H 932 (2003) 
24 IL} 2 J OJ & [20031 3 All SA 436 (T); SANDU v Minister of Defence & others (4) Unre-
ported. TPD (Bertelsman J). 
8 SANnU v Minister of nefence &: others (2) 2003 0) SA 239. (2003) 24 IL} 1495 (T). 
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In the first case concerning the South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence & another (1),~ the Constitucional Court held that sol-
diers were akin to employees and accordingly workers for (he purposes of 
section 23 of the Constitution.· o Accordingly provisions in the Defence 
Act
ll 
and its regulations. which prohibited soldiers from belonging La trade 
unions and from engaging in public protests, were declared [Q be invalid. 
In response the Minister promulgated a set of regulations that provided for 
the registration and recognition of trade unions and (hat established a 
'Military Bargaining Council' and a 'Military Arbitration Board' for the res-
olution of disputes. I. 
In a nutshell, the regulations established a collective bargaining struc-
ture and process for the Defence Force. That structure and process, how-
ever, did not permit soldiers to strike. SANOU, a trade union organising 
soldiers, was registered in (erms of the regulations and subsequently 
admitted to the Military Bargaining Council. 
The proceedings of the Council did not progress smoothly. There were 
disputes over procedure, the agenda and the nature and scope of the bar-
gaining process, particularly over policy. The union accused the Depart-
ment of Defence of bad faith bargaining, in particular the use of un-
acceptable tactics such as delays, misrepresentations and negotiating 
without a mandate. The Department accused the trade union of being 
aggressive. It created unrealistic expectations among its members and 
threatened labour unrest when those expectations were not met. In 
particular, the trade union resorted to scathing and insulting personal 
attacks on the Department's collective bargaining representatives. Re-
lations degenerated, the trade union threatened industrial action and the 
Minister suspended participation on the Bargaining Council. 
This precipitated the first of the duty to bargain cases.o; The union 
sought to compel the Minister and the Department to bargain with it in 
good faith relying on section 23(5)"~ and arguing that it conferred a consti-
tutional duty to bargain, which the Minister and the Department had 
violated 
In the first application," the High Court declined to hold that section 
23(5) conferred a duty to bargain. The trade union subsequently brought 
several further applications based on the same legal claim but on different 
factual bases. These applications culminated In two judgments both hold-
ing section 23(5) to confer a constitutional duty to bargain, All three cases 
are on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
<) 19<)9 (6) lK!.H 6 [5. 1999 (4) SA 469 & ([ 99Y) 20 ILf 2265 «(C). 
[0 Constitution of the Republic ot" SOUiIl Africd [OR of [99b 
[[ Act 44 of [957 subseqlJl!nlly repeClfed by section 106 of Ille Defence Ace 42 of 2002, 
excl!pl for section [04 i'lnd lhe FirSl Schedule, being lhe Military Disciplinary (ode 
[2 See also section 55 of lhe Detence Act 12 ot 2002 which carne in([J operaliorl on 2 JlHle 
200" 
I) See fI 8 dbuve 
14 (onsrilurion of the Republic of Soulh Africa 10K of [99b 
I 5 Sec n 8 atmvc. 
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The reasoning engaged in all three cases turned on the text of section 
23(5)." Judges Smit and Bertelsmann held in SANDU (3) and (4/' respect-
ively, that the text of section 23(5) clearly imposed a duty to bargain. 
Judge Van der Westhuizen in SANDU (2)" held that the diFference in word-
ing between section 23(5) - 'the right to engage in collective bargaining' -
and its predecessor in section 27(3)'" - 'the right to bargain collectively' 
pointed to a distinction between a Freedom and a right. The Court relied 
on 'academic authority,20 to support that conclusion. That academic auth~ 
ority relied primarily on a textual analysis of the section and the voluntar-
ism espoused by the [LO. 21 
Given the strong reliance on the I LO Conventions by the Constitutional 
Court in two recent cases,22 the High Court could have made more of pub-
lic international law and the !LO Conventions on Freedom of Association 
and Collective Bargaining to support the court's conclusjon,n There are 
other arguments not referred to in the Court's decision that support its 
conclusion. 
The first argument is that a positive right to bargain is not just a right -
it is a policy regime that involves fundamental choices as to the Form and 
level of collective bargaining. It commits a labour market to a collective 
bargaining regime centred on the workplace rather than at the level of in-
dustry. It reqUires a regulatory regime that reqUires court or tribunal deter-
mination of -
• who must bargain with whom - the threshold issues of representative-
ness; 
• the bargaining constituency or unit; 
• what may be bargained about ~ bargaining subjects: and 
• the manner in which bargaining takes place (bargaining in good faith 
and the duty of Fair representation). 
The second argument is that the positive right to bargain COllectively is not 
an element of the right in public international law. The ILO Convention 98 
(which South Africa ratiFied in 1996) records the ratiFying member's obli-
gation in Article 4, which reads: 
\ 6 See n 6 above. 
17 See n 7 ab[}ve 
18 See n 8 above. 
19 Constitution of \he Republic ot South Africa Act 200 of 1993. S 27(3) read 'Workers and 
employers shall have the right ([) organise and bargain collecrivcly' 
20 Brassey and Cooper in Chaskalson and others Constitutiunal Law of Sourh Africa (1998) 
at 30-30; Cheadle in Davis and others F1Indamental Rights in (he Constitlllion: Commen-
tary and Cases (I !)97) at 232-5: Thompson and Benjamin SA Labour Law Vol J at AA [-
[3; Grogan Workplace Law (2001) at 288; and Brassey Emp/(Jymenr and Labour Luw Vol 
1 at AI-B. 
21 International Labour Organisation; established in [91!) of which SOlJth Africa was a 
founder member. 
22 NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) BCLR 182, [2003J 2 BLLR 103; (2003) 24 Ilj 305 
and 2003 0) SA 511 (CC) and NEHAWU v University oj Cape Town 2003 (2) BCLI{ 154, 
2003 (3) SA I &. (2003) 24 JL) 95 (CC) 
2.1 For an extensive coverage of the subject see Cheadle, Davis and I Jaysorn South African 
Constirlllional Law: the Bill Of Righrs (2002) a[ para [B. 7. 
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Measures appropriate to national conditions shaH be taken, where necessary, to 
encou.rage and promote ttle full deployment and utilisation of machinery for vol-
untary negotiation between employers or employers organisations and worker 
organisations with a view to regulation of terms and conditions of employment 
by means of collective agreement. 
The ILO Committee of Freedom of Association has glossed this as follows: 
Collective bargaining, if it is to be effective, must assume a voluntary qualily 
and not entdil recourse to measures of compulsion which would alter the volun-
tary natu.re of such bargdining,?l 
Where courts in comparative jurisdictions have derived a freedom to bar-
gain collectively from the right to freedom of associalion, they have not 
deduced a positive right to compulsory bargaining. The European Court of 
Human Rights has consistently held that the right to form and Join trade 
unions is not limited to association alone but extends to action in pursuit 
of the objects of the trade union: 
a trade union must be free to strive for the protection of its members' interests, 
and the indiVidual members have a right, in order to protect their interests, that 
the trade union should be heard 
But It has shied away from deriving a posItive duty to bargain from the 
freedom LO have that voice heard. In Wilson v U/(" the European Coun of 
Human Rights held that, where the trade union had the right to strike, the 
absence of a legal obligation on employers to enter into collective bargain-
ing did not constitute a violation of article I 1 of the Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. An obligation to bargain com-
pulsorily is not the only way that the goal of collective bargaining can be 
achieved 
The third argument is the text. The text differs from the stronger word-
ing used in the interim Constitution which imposed the right to bargain 
collectively. As argued above the right to engage, imports a freedom 
ralher than a positive right. This is supponed by the second and third sen-
tences of section 23(5).210 Collective bargaining is constiwled hy a complex 
of rights and duties, processes and institU[ions. The Object of the second 
sentence is to provide a clear indication that the inclusion of a right to 
engage in co!lective bargaining is not an invitation to constitutionalise the 
content of collective labour law. The inference is that the right is restricted 
to a freedom and that [he forms, processes, institutions and levels are the 
subject matter for the legislature. 
This argument is also consonant with the implicit approach taken in 
NatIOnal Union oj Metalworkers oj South AJrica and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) 
Ltd and the Minister oj Labour." In that case, the majority of the Constitu-
tional Court held that the right to freedom of association in section 18 and 
the right ro join a trade union in section 23 of the Constitution included 
2'1 l~reedO(1\ ot Association Digest 1996 at para 8'15 See dl~() [he Europcdll Sucial CharLer 
(Pari l[ articlc 6) 
25 [2000] [I{LI, S(JH 
7.6 See n 6 above. 
27 2003 (2) IKLR j 82. l20U3] 2 I:\LLR [03. (2003) 2·111j 305 & 2003 0) SA SJ") (CC) 
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the right of employees to have their trade union represent them in indiv~ 
idual matters." This aspect of the right has no judicially enforceable rem-
edy under the LRA for unrepresentative trade unions. The Court passed no 
comment on this but by interpreting the LRA so as to entrench the right of 
unrepresentative trade unions to strike in order to acquire organisational 
facilities, it implicitly endorsed the statutory scheme that constitutional 
'rights' do not have to be judicially enforceable but may be enforceable in 
other ways - ie, in the area of labour law, through collective bargaining 
backed by the resort to industrial action. 
Counsel for the trade union raised an important argument against this 
construction of section 23. Section 23 guarantees a carefully balanced 
package of rights. freedoms and duties related to labour relations. This 
package includes the right to strike. The right to strike is a powerful tool in 
the hands of workers to persuade their employer to bargain collectively. 
Since the military are prohibited from striking, the balance in section 23 is 
disturbed. In order to restore that balance, there should be a duty on the 
employer to participate in collective bargaining. It is not clear from the 
judgment whether this was an argument over the meaning of section 23 
or an argument concerning the constitutionality of the regulations, which 
prohibited the right to strike. 
As a limitations clause analysis, the argument has much to support it. It 
cannot however be sustained as a basis for constructing the meaning of 
section 23. In any event, there is a simple answer to the argument. The 
solution is not a constitutional duty to bargain but a right to refer disputes 
to arbitration. That is the appropriate remedy for limiting the right (0 
strikeC~ - not the imposition of a toothless duty to bargain. 
But the most extraordinary point missed by judges and counsel is that 
there was never any need to resort to section 23(5) in order to find a duty 
to bargain. The duty flows from the constitution of the Military Bargaining 
Council established in terms of the General Regulations for the South 
African National Defence Force and Reserve.·'\o Clause 5 of the Councils' 
Constitution provides that the objectives of the Council are to 'negotiate 
and bargain collectively to reach agreement on matters of mutual in~ 
terest' . 
If this is not sufficient, the Council is given the power to conclude col-
lective agreements (clause 6) and clause 21 spells out the procedure for 
any party wishing 'to initiate negotiations for the amendment of an exist-
ing agreement or the conclusion of a new agreement' and if at the end of 
that procedure there is a deadlock the dispute is referred to the Military 
Arbitration Board, established under the regulations, for compulsory arbi-
tration. 
28 At para 34 
29 See para 574 of (he Digesr, which requires that 'restrictions Oil the right to strike should 
be accompanied by adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration pro-
ceedings' . 
. 10 GC 20376 20 August 1999. 
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There is no need to look for the duty to bargain in the Constitution. It 
already exists in the regulations and the Bargaining Council's Constitution. 
4 EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
There are currenrly twO cases in which the Minister's power to extend 
collective agreements of bargaining councils to non~party employers and 
employees is being challenged on grounds of constitutional invalidity. 
The grounds of constitutional invalidity are that the extension of collec-
tive agreements to non~parties is an infringement of the right to freedom 
of association, the right to engage in collective bargaining. the right to 
choose a trade or profession and the right not to be deprived of property 
arbitrarily. Only one of the alleged grounds warrants attention and that is 
the limitation on (he right to bargain collectively, in particular to bargain 
for Jess than the minimum wages prescribed in the extended agreement. 
The justifiability of the limitation on the right to engage in collective bar-
gaining depends very milch on the justifications for sector level bargaining 
and the necessity of the extension mechanism for securing the integrity of 
sector level collective bargaining or its alternative (collective action). The 
right is also not absolutely abrogated - no bar is placed on joining the par-
ties to the bargaining council and participating in collective bargaininB through these institutions. Moreover provision is made for exemptions I 
which provide the space in which non-party employers can negotiate and 
conclude agreements different from [he extended agreement. 
5 THE CURRENT STATE OF SECTOR LEVEL BARGAINING" 
Although a cascading effect of reform was expected with the implemen~ 
tation of the new LRA, the collective bargaining results have been disap-
poiming. The sectoral nature of the bargaining councils remains fractured 
and piecemeal. 
There are currently 57 councils registered with the Department of 
Labour, of which only 46 are functioning. There were 104 in 1983, 87 in 
1992 and 80 in 1995. The decline in the number of councils ought not to 
be a matter of concern provided that the decline is associated with a con~ 
comitant consolidation. Godfrey. Maree and Theron attribute only part of 
this decline in numbers as a function of consolidation. It is clear from the 
number of employers and employees covered by some of the councils,) 
that they are not separately sustainable. And it is also clear from the 
31 S 32(3)(e) or [he Labour Rcl,f(io[ls Au 66 of 1995 
32 The d,llo Llsed in this seni()[l is drawn FrolTl the invdllJilble rt:search dune and contained 
in iUI IlfIpublished paper: Shc.lne Godfrey, Johan Maree and Jan Ttleron S[(lIUfOry Central-
ised Bargaimng aIler the new LRA: A socia-legal examinmian oj the IJaryrlimny council I>)'s-
{em and the challenges II faces. Labollr dfld Enterprise Prnjecr. Uiliversity of Cape Town 
33 Nearly half ot' rhe councils cover 5000 employees or less. Only five councils in the pri· 
vate senor COVer more [han 100 000 employees. 
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councils being wound up that whole industries are being denuded of coun-
cils, particularly in building and the hospitality industries. 
Notwithstanding an endeavour at NEDLAC to provide a broad goal of 32 
sectors, little has been done by the trade union movement and the De-
partment of I.abour to achieve the consolidation of the different councils 
into single sector councils, 
Of a working population of approximately ten million,. only 2 337 72 I 
employees are covered by bargaining councils. Over half" of those are in 
the public sector broadly defined: public service, local government and 
parastatals,'J:, Add the three other large councils (Metal, ~h Motor'H and 
Clothing) '" and over 2 million employees are covered by effectively ten 
councils. The balance of approximately 336 564 employees are covered 
by 42 councils. The figures demonstrate that approximately 20 % of the 
workforce is covered by bargaining councils but if one removes the public 
sector then only 10% of the workforce in the private sector (approx-
imately just under 9 million) is covered by bargaining councils. 
The President in his state of nation address announced the Govern-
ment's intention to exempt small, medium and micro-enterprises from 
central bargaining." It is not quite clear what is intended but the fact is 
that over half the current bargaining councils cover enterprises that on 
average employ less than 20 employees; ie in the micro and very small 
range. Only five councils in the private sector have average firm sizes in 
medium to large enterprises; ie over 50 employees. The implications for 
the sustainability of these councils is obvious, 
h appears though, despite complaints, that the exemptions process is 
working reasonably well. Approximately 77 % of approximately 14 500 
exemptions were granted in 2003, approximately I % partially granted, 
about 5 % under consideration at the time the statistics were taken and 
approximately 17 % refused. Most councils have made provision for rep-
resentation of small businesses on the council and many provide for rep-
resentation on exemption boards, 
.14 Approximately I 461 000 employees are covered by {he public sector councils 
35 Transnet Bargaining Council covers abow 185 000 employees. 
16 Approximately 270 000 employees. 
17 Approximalely 154000 employees, 
.18 ApproximaLely I 17000 employees. 
39 'Based on (he review of [he regulatory framework as it applies to small, rnediunl and 
micro-emerprises, before rhe end 01 (he year, government will complete the system of 
exemptions for these bllsinesse:> wilh regard to [axes, levies, as well as central bargain-
ing ami other labour arrangements. enabling these to be fac«)re<i imo the medium-term 
expenditure cycle.' The review is the SBP report on Counting the COStS or Red Tape. It is 
wonh noting an important cave<H to [he repon on page b: 'It is important to note that 
we have not attempted to measure the benefits of regulation. Our estimates of COITI-
pliance cos[s arc gross of the bcnefirs accrUing to individudl firms or [0 SOCiety in g{:n-
era!. Clearly, the benefits of regulation are ofren substantial, but these are llsually far 
beller llnderstood than their costs. It is therefore appropriate to focus research efron, at 
least in the tirst instance, on regulatory costs.' 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The collective bargaining model espoused by the LRA is under attack. It is 
threatened with coun challenges to its constitutionality. There is no can-
ceflect effort on the part of the Government or the trade union movement 
to consolidate and deepen senor level bargaining arrangements. Indeed 
(he Government is considering a blanket exemption of small business 
from sectoral bargaining agreements. the consequence of which will be to 
further weaken the system of sectoral bargaining. The trade unions con~ 
tinue to conclude detailed collective agreements at sectoral level rather 
than framework agreements that are more appropriate to that level of bar-
gaining. Detailed sectoral agreements not only ferment resistance on the 
part of employers but they effectively disempower union organisation in 
the workplace 
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